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Introduction

2
Copyright is dead. The first to pronounce its passing was probably John Perry

Barlow. In hisfamous 1993 essay, “The Economy of Ideas,” 3 he defended the theory that
dematerialization has made copyright, which was designed to protect the bottle and not
the wine, irrelevant, for in the digital era the bottle has disappeared.4 He then handed
down his verdict, with no possible appeal:
Intellectual property law cannot be patched, retrofitted, or expanded to contain the
gasses of digitized expression any more than real estate law might be revised to
cover the allocation of broadcasting spectrum. (Which, in fact, rather resembles
what is being attempted here.) We will need to develop an entirely new set of
methods as befits this entirely new set of circumstances.
In the slipstream of this former rancher and spokesperson for the Grateful Dead,
academics in the United States and in other countries began to explain why copyright had
become obsolete in the Internet era.5 However, the funeral was perhaps a bit premature.
2

Eben Moglen uses a “Star Wars” analogy to make the point: “. . . the obsolescence of the
IPdroid is neither unforeseeable nor tragic. Indeed it may find itself clanking off into the desert,
still lucidly explaining to an imaginary room the profitably complicated rules for a world that no
longer exists.” Anarchism Triumphant: Free Software and the Death of Copyright, in THE
COMMODIFICATION OF INFORMATION 107, 131 (Niva Elkin-Koren & Neil Weinstock Netanel
eds., 2002)
3
John Perry Barlow, The Economy of Ideas: A framework for patents and copyrights in the
Digital Age. (Everything you know about intellectual property is wrong.). WIRED, 2.03, Mar.
1994, available at: http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/2.03/economy.ideas.html
4
“Copyright worked well because, Gutenberg notwithstanding, it was hard to make a book.
Furthermore, books froze their contents into a condition that was as challenging to alter as it was
to reproduce. [. . .] For all practical purposes, the value was in the conveyance and not the thought
conveyed.”
“In other words, the bottle was protected, not the wine. Now, as information enters Cyberspace,
the native home of Mind, these bottles are vanishing.”
5
The reader will find a good example in the article by Glynn S. Lunney Jr., The Death of
Copyright: Digital Technology, Private Copying, and the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 87
Virginia L. Rev. 813, 815 (2001): “COPYRIGHT is dead. The Digital Millennium Copyright Act
("DMCA") has killed it. […] With the enactment of the DMCA, there is a very real danger that
our system of protecting creative works will serve primarily private interests. If so, then the
protection of creative works will have come full circle […] and copyright, in the sense of
protection intended primarily to serve the public interest, will surely have died”. See also Robert
C. Denicola, Mostly Dead? Copyright Law in the New Millennium, 47 J. Copyright Soc’y of the
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Copyright is still with us, and few can prove that a (capitalist) society6 without something
like copyright would ensure as well, or better, the creation and distribution of new works.
But certain blows have been dealt. First of all, it must be said that the copyright
industries (the so-called “rightsholders”) have not been dazzling in their rush to adapt to
the Internet. These industries have essentially fought the Internet, and the music and
7
movie industries are still fighting. I was among those who suggested in 1998 that a
8
“business model” approach be used. The text industry and scientific journals put their

material on line four or five years ago, and some have considerably broadened the
choices offered to their readers, whether by making available lab data files (too
voluminous to print out) or three-dimensional models of molecules, or simply by
accelerating distribution.9

USA 193, 207 (2000): “Yet how much of the old, legislatively-defined copyright will remain
relevant in the new Millennium? Copyright law may be mostly dead in the wake of the DMCA,
but ‘mostly dead is still alive.’ Traditional copyright will no doubt remain as a convenient if
redundant alternative to breach of contract. Copyright law will also be necessary for works that
leak out of their containers and are accessible without a contract. We may also need traditionallooking copyright law to pursue stronger protection abroad.”
6
See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 123 S.Ct. 769, 785 (n. 18) (2003), “…copyright law celebrates the
profit motive, recognizing that the incentive to profit from the exploitation of copyrights will
redound to the public benefit by resulting in the proliferation of knowledge… The profit motive is
the engine that ensures the progress of science. […] Rewarding authors for their creative labor
and ‘promot[ing]…. Progress’’ are thus complementary; as James Madison observed, in
copyright ‘[t]he public good fully coincides… with the claims of individuals.”
7
We might remember the fight against the photocopier. In a 1961 report of the Register of
Copyrights in the United States, a similar alarm was being sounded: “. . . Copying has now taken
on new dimensions with the development of photocopying devices by which any quantity of
material can be reproduced readily and in multiple copies . . .” REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF
COPYRIGHTS ON THE GENERAL REVISION OF THE U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW (Jul. 25, 1961).
8
Daniel Gervais, Electronic Rights Management and Digital Identifier Systems, 4 J. of Elec.
Publishing (1999), available at http://www.press.umich.edu/jep/04-03: “The content is there. In
almost all cases, it is in digital form or can be digitized. Networks with sufficient bandwidth are
being built, and many business users and individual consumers are already connected. They are
ready for the content. Many copyright industries and other rights holders are coming to the view
that global networks represent good business opportunities and that digital, though it may be
different, is nonetheless interesting commercially. In fact, it may be the only future growth area.
To put it simply, digital is inevitable.” This was a report presented to WIPO (Geneva) in
December 1998.
9
See Daniel Gervais, Copyright and eCommerce, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE GLOBAL
MARKETPLACE (Melvin Simensky et al. eds., 2001 Supp., 2002).
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After some setbacks concerning standardization issues,10 and many sensational
11
trials aiming to impede exchanges of files between Web surfers on a central site or a

peer-to-peer network, the recording industry is just starting to authorize downloading of
music files.12 The movie industry is still testing distribution systems.
The main concern of most industries seems to be to avoid any reuse of the
downloaded content. And this is precisely where the problem of adaptability of copyright
to the digital world is most obvious.
This paper argues that it is time to replace the existing set of copyright rights by
focusing on its true policy objectives. The paper thus begins with a brief look at the
history of copyright and tries to identify what is wrong with extant norms. In other
words, the spotlight will be on the apparent chasm between the policy objectives and the
norms. The paper will then suggest that a new international copyright norm could be
created based on the Berne Convention’s three-step test, in harmony with the US fair use
doctrine13.

10

I am thinking here mainly of the Secure Digital Music Initiative (SDMI), a project that has been
put on the back burner. On the project’s site at www.sdmi.org is the following (Nov. 2003): “As
of May 18, 2001 SDMI is on hiatus, and intends to re-assess technological advances at some later
date.”
11
Including the famous suit against Napster: A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004
(9th Cir. 2001). See Sarah H. McWane, Hollywood vs. Silicon Valley: DeCSS Down, Napster to
Go?, 9 CommLaw Conspectus 87, 107 (2001): “The recording industry holds stubbornly to the
retailing model where people are actually purchasing CDs when, in reality, people are now
downloading MP3s”. See Michael S. Elkin and Alexandra Khlyavich, Napster Near and Far:
Will the Ninth Circuit’s Ruling Affect Secondary Infringement in the Outer Reaches of
Cyberspace?, 27 Brooklyn J. Int'l L. 381 (2002) (discussing the findings in and the impact of the
Napster case).
12
For example, on the iTunes.com site belonging to Apple Computers, became an overnight
success in spite of the fact that originally it only worked with Macintosh computers using the
latest version (OS10) of the operating system. See Neill Strauss, Apple Finds a Route For Online
Music Sales, N.Y. Times, May 29, 2003, at E1. See also Press Release, Apple Computers, One
Million Copies of iTunes for Windows Software Downloaded in Three and a Half Days (Oct. 20,
2003), at http://www.apple.com/pr/library/2003/oct/20itunes.html.
13
Codified in 17 §107. Use will be considered fair (and consequently non-infringing) according
to the four following criteria:
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial nature or
is for nonprofit educational purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a
whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work.
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I. A Brief History of Copyright

The first copyright statute14 in the United Kingdom15 was essentially a privilege
granted by the Crown to authors and publishers to prevent reuse by other publishers. It
seems to have been derived from a previous act designed to limit publications to
authorized publishers16. In other words, it was a “professional right,” used mostly by
professionals against other professionals: Certain commercial entities waited to see which
books were selling well and then started to copy them. This created a free-rider system,
which was rather inefficient from a commercial standpoint: publishers had little incentive
to invest in the publication of new books and authors were suffering from the narrow
bandwidth for the dissemination of their books. This “free” and rather raw capitalism
thus led to a market failure in the book trade thathad to be regulated.

On the Continent things were taking a different route. While events paralleled
those in the UK (there were printing privileges in Italy and pre-Revolution France since
at least the early 17th century) for several decades, things took a different turn at the end
of the 18th century: Authors’ rights were born in the purest tradition of human rights, i.e.,
as natural rights. As such, they had special status and could not easily be limited by the
State, politically or legally.

14

Prior to the Statute of Anne (see next note), there had been no copyright proper. Artists in
classical Greece and the Roman Empire did not seek personal attribution, and it was common to
identify someone else (a teacher, a famous person) as the “author.” During the early and middle
Middle Ages (approximately from the 8th to the 12th century), almost all artistic works were
created in Europe under the patronage of the Roman Catholic Church, which became de facto the
owner of all “works.” Michelangelo was one of the first artists under Church patronage to insist
on personal attribution. The insistence of the personal role of the author and the recognition of
the link between authors and works is mostly a child of the Enlightenment, with, e.g., Kant’s
(and later Hegel’s) view that the author infused his or her will into the work. See Harold C.
Streibich, The Moral Right of Ownership to Intellectual Property: Part I - From the Beginning to
the Age of Printing, 6 Mem. St. U. L. Rev. 1 (1975); Dan Rosen, Artists’ Moral Rights: A
European Evolution, An American Revolution, 2 Cardozo Arts & Ent. L.J. 155 (1983);Cheryl
Swack, Safeguarding Artistic Creation and the Cultural Heritage: A Comparison of Droit Moral
Between France and the United States, 22 Colum.-VLA J.L. & Arts 361 (1998).
15
Statute of Anne, 1710, 8 Ann., c. 19 (Eng.).
16
This is the argument made in L. Ray Patterson and Craig Joyce, Copyright in 1791: An Essay
Concerning the Founders’ View of the Copyright Power Granted to Congress in Article I, Section
8, Clause 8 of the U.S. Constitution, 52 Emory L.J. 909, 916 (2003).
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But here again the rights were exercised mostly against infringers who were, by
and large, either small-time pirates, or professionals lacking a certain ethical view of
publishing (truth be told, the boundary between authorized reuse of existing material and
infringement was not and is not always clear.) Authors were also able to use their new
human right against publishers who exploited them beyond what they considered to be an
acceptable limit.

The history of copyright and authors’ rights in the decades that follow is
essentially that of an adaptation to new forms of creation (e.g, cinema) and, more
importantly, of new ways to disseminate copyrighted works (radio, then television
broadcasting, cable, satellite). The result is a bundle composed of “copyright rights” i.e.,
a list of specific rights in respect of particular forms of exploitation of works
(reproduction, public performance/communication to the public, adaptation, etc.).
It is important to add, however, that from the 18th century until the 1990’s, those
copyright rights were aimed at, and used against professional entities, either legitimate
entities such as broadcasters, cable companies or distributors; or illegitimate ones such as
cassette and CD pirates. In most cases, these professionals were intermediaries with no
interest in the content itself (i.e., they could have sold shoes instead of movies). Their job
was to get content to end-users, most of whom were consumers and of no interest to
copyright law (or lawyers).

A fundamental shift has occurred since digital technology and especially the
Internet: copyright is now a legal tool that rightsholders can use against end-users,
including consumers17. Rightsholders want to use the copyright tools at their disposal for
a dual purpose: ensuring that end-users pay the fee for the material they use (which they
17

See Press Release, Recording Industry Association of America, Recording Industry Begins
Suing P2P File Sharers Who Illegally Offer Copyrighted Music Online, (Sept. 8, 2003), at
http://www.riaa.com/news/newsletter/090803.asp. See also John Borland, RIAA sues 261 file
swappers, CNET News.com, at http://news.com.com/2100-1023-5072564.html?tag=nl (Sept. 8,
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see as including getting access through authorized sources), and preventing the
transmission of the material by those “end”-users to other users (in other words
preventing them from becoming intermediaries). To put it bluntly, rightsholders want to
ensure they want to ensure that end-users remain just that, end-users.

Individual users on the other hand want to harness the enormous capabilities of
the Internet to access, use and disseminate information and content. The demand is huge
and ever increasing. Internet technology has responded to this huge pull not only by
providing the initial adequate technological means but by responding to legal barriers by
providing new ones: close Napster and peer-to-peer emerges. Try to shut P2P down, as
was done in the recent wave of subpoenas and law suits against individual file
“sharers18,” and quite predictably another technology will surface: anonymous file
exchange systems, thus defeating any subpoena served on the ISP.19 Because ISPs will
not know the identity of users who are exchanging music files, subpoenas will be
ineffective. In a similar vein, if a way is found to block music files, software that
disguises the music content will be invented.20 In short, users seem poised to win this
war and commentators are already saying that the music industry will be lucky to be
around to lick its wounds.

The best way forward for the music industry is to completely redefine old
business models based on albums, physical copies (CDs) and, more importantly, the
2003) and John Borland, RIAA files 80 new file-swapping suits, CNET News.com, at
http://news.com.com/2100-1027-5099738.html (October 30, 2003).
18
Id.
19
See Recording Indus. Ass’n of Am., Inc. v. Verizon Internet Servs. 257 F. Supp. 2d 244 (D.C.
2003). CNet reported the increasing use of proxies to ensure the anonymity of file-sharers. See
John Borland, Covering tracks: New privacy hope for P2P, CNET News, Feb. 24, 2004.
Available at <http://news.com.com/2100-1027-5164413.html>(Accessed Feb. 25, 2004). Another
example is programmer Wyatt Wasicek has created a program called AnonX that masks the
Internet address of people who use file-sharing programs such as Kazaa. Wasicek promises not to
divulge his 7,000 users’ Internet addresses, and believes he cannot be forced to do so. See
<http://www.siliconvalley.com/mld/siliconvalley/news/editorial/7927993.htm>.
20
Regularly, new technologies that promise to stop P2P sharing of copyrighted material (such as
Audible Magic) emerge, usually with some concerns about privacy. See John Borland, “File-swap
‘killer’ grabs attention,” CNet News, March 3, 2004. Available at < http://news.com.com/21001025_3-5168505.html> (accessed March 4, 2003).
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abandonment of the scarcity paradigm. Information is not valuable on the Internet
because it is scarce; it is valuable because it is found.

The commercial and public relations cost of trying to apply copyright to end-users
illustrates a simple fact: that is not what copyright was meant to do. The history and
underlying policy objectives of copyright indicate that is a right to be exercised by and
against professionals. One should add to this equation the fact that copyright was always
used to regulate and organize markets when a new form of dissemination was invented.
The Internet is, from this perspective, probably the biggest jump in technological terms
and copyright was used not to organize the music market but rather to deny it. That will
not work. Copyright is not a dam, it s a river.21 It was always used to channel use and
optimize exploitation, not to entirely shut out a new medium.

Following the same train of thought, exceptions and limitations to copyright were
also mostly written in the days of the professional intermediary as user. This explains
why in several national laws, the main exceptions can be grouped into two categories:
private use, which governments previously regarded as “unregulatable” and where
copyright law abdicated its authority by nature; and use by specific professional
intermediaries: libraries (and archives) and certain public institutions, including schools,
courts and sometimes the government itself. There are still today several very broad
exceptions for “private use” (e.g., Italy, Japan) that were adopted in the days when the
end-user was just that, the end of the distribution chain.

The result of those exceptions expressed, in a US context, as a combination of fair
use and the first-sale doctrine,22 meant that end-users were trusted by the copyright

21

The successes of publishers of scientific and medical journals show that using copyright norms
in the Internet environment is possible. By making journals available online and leveraging the
technology to provide, e.g., raw lab data or files containing three-dimensional images, those
publishers, who still sell plenty of paper copies, have increased total revenues. The key is to trust
users, and let them use the material. Trust was always implicit in pre-Internet days, with legal
devices such as the first-sale doctrine, private copying exceptions, fair use, etc.
22
See R. Anthony Reese, The First Sale Doctrine in the Era of Digital Networks, 44 B.C. L. Rev.
577 (2003). (“For at least ninety-five years, the first sale doctrine in U.S. copyright law has
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industries23. Users enjoyed both “room to move” because of exceptions such as fair use
and rights stemming from their ownership of a physical copy.24

The fact that private use is not expressly mentioned as an exception in a number
of national laws or the Berne Convention is not surprising: it was of little interest to
copyright holders until the invention of the VCR and double-deck cassette players, which
only became popular in the 1970’s. A number of countries then introduced regulation not
to stop the practice (and there were famous court cases where this was tried, including the
Sony case in the US25), but rather to compensate rightsholders by introducing levies on
blank tapes and, in certain cases, on recording equipment as well.26 The inapplicability
of analog exceptions to the Internet is illustrated by the debate concerning § 110(2) of the
US Copyright Act. It contains limitations on the nature and content of the transmission,
and the identity and location of the recipients. As was noted by the United States

allowed those who buy copies of a copyrighted work to resell, rent, or lend those copies.
Copyright law is often viewed as a balance of providing authors with sufficient incentives to
create their works and maximizing public access to those works. And the first sale doctrine has
been a major bulwark in providing public access by facilitating the existence of used book and
record stores, video rental stores, and, perhaps most significantly, public libraries.”)
23
Not that they liked it. The battle against the VCR is a good example. Of course, today video
sales and rentals generate a substantial chunk of change for the film industry.
24
The Canadian Supreme Court in the 2002 case of Théberge v. Galeries d’art du Petit
Champlain, Inc., [2002] SCC 34, wrote an interesting comment on this point: “Excessive control
by holders of copyrights and other forms of intellectual property may unduly limit the ability of
the public domain to incorporate and embellish creative innovation in the long-term interests of
society as a whole, or create practical obstacles to proper utilization. This is reflected in the
exceptions to copyright […] such as fair dealing [..]. This case demonstrates the basic economic
conflict between the holder of the intellectual property in a work and the owner of the tangible
property that embodies the copyrighted expressions.” (emphasis added)
25
Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 78 L. Ed. 2d 574, 104 S. Ct. 774
(1984).
26
P. BERNT HUGENHOLTZ et al., INSTITUTE FOR INFORMATION LAW, THE FUTURE OF LEVIES IN
A DIGITAL ENVIRONMENT 9 (2003), available at
http://www.ivir.nl/publications/other/DRM%20Levies%20Final%20Report.pdf: “Historically,
copyright levy systems have been premised on the assumption that certain uses, especially private
copying, of protected works cannot be controlled and exploited individually. With the advent of
digital rights management (DRM) this assumption must be re-examined. […] Where such
individual rights management is available there would appear to remain no need, and no
justification, for mandatory levy systems”.
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Register of Copyrights in her May 1999 Report on Copyright and Digital Distance
Education27:

“As written, section 110(2) has only limited application to courses offered over a
digital network. Because it exempts only acts of performance or display, it would not
authorize the acts of reproduction or distribution involved in this type of digital
transmission. In addition, students who choose to take a distance course without special
circumstances that prevent their attendance in classrooms may not qualify as eligible
recipients.” 28

Quite logically, the report recommends updating section 110(2) “to allow the
same activities to take place using digital delivery mechanisms, while controlling the
risks involved, would continue the basic policy balance struck in 1976.”29 Such an
adaptation of 15 USC 110(2) is possible because it still applies to professional users,
namely educators. In the case of individual users, the rightsholder’s unwillingness to
trust those users and the need to technologically enforce use legal and/or contractual use
restrictions has led not only o a refusal to consider new exceptions but in fact to efforts to
radically reduce any room to move left for those users.30

27

MARYBETH PETERS, U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, REPORT ON COPYRIGHT AND DIGITAL
DISTANCE EDUCATION, available at http://www.copyright.gov/reports/de_rprt.pdf (May 1999).
28
Id. at vii-viii.
29
Id. at xv.
30
The image of “fared use” has been mentioned in this connection. See Tom W. Bell, Fair Use vs
Fared Use: The Impact of Automated Rights Management on Copyright's Fair Use Doctrine, 76
N.C. L. Rev. 557, 559 (1998): “[automated rights management (ARM)] enables information
providers to enforce standard copyright claims mechanically, without resort to the threat of
litigation. It also allows copyright owners and others to create and enforce contracts that specify
other sets of rights. Although ARM may give information providers newfound power to control
the use of their wares, it does not necessarily justify that control. The proper legal response to
ARM thus remains an open--and vital—question.”
“ARM portends far-reaching and unprecedented effects on rights to information in the new digital
intermedia. Specifically, ARM threatens to reduce radically the scope of the fair use defense to
copyright infringement. ARM will interact with existing legal doctrines to supplant fair use with
an analogous but distinctly different doctrine: fared use.”
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II. The “Problem with Copyright”

Is the copyright deer stuck in policy headlights? To a certain extent, the answer is
yes, but only if one tries to fit too much into the copyright house. Copyright was, as a
regulatory vehicle, a way to maintain the necessary level of scarcity among professionals
who create, publish and disseminate material embodying human intellectual creativity so
as to allow the development of an organized marketplace. In other words, copyright
works well as a regulation of commercial intercourse. Extant exceptions to copyright
protection discussed above show that it is not well adapted to, and was not meant to
control private use by individuals.

The problem stems in large part from the way copyright rights were expressed, in
turn a direct reflection of its history. From its very beginning in the 1710 Statute of
Anne31, where copyright was presented as a way to promote the creation and
dissemination of new works by protecting publishers from free-riding by other
publishers, to today’s copyright legislation and international treaties, including the Berne
Convention32 and TRIPS Agreement33, copyright has been expressed in terms of rights
attaching to the nature of the use, not to its effect. In other words, rights have been
granted with respect to acts of reproduction, performance, adaptation, etc. But was this
ever the true focus of copyright policy? I suggest that its actual target was commercial
use and reuse and the prevention of free-riding by competitors, including of course true
commercial pirates34.
31

See supra note 15.
Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1886, revised at
Paris July 24, 1971, 25 UST 1341, 828 U.N.T.S. 221 (hereinafter Berne Convention).
33
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY
ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS: THE LEGAL TEXTS, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299, 33
I.L.M. 1125, 1197 (hereinafter TRIPS Agreement).
34
The comment is limited to the so-called economic rights. Interestingly, where moral rights
exist, a case can be made that (a) the test if not nature but effect and (b) the rationale is partly non
commercial. First, the standard test for the right of integrity is, as expressed in Article 6bis of the
Berne Convention, a right to oppose “any distortion, mutilation or other modification of, or
32

11

I suggest that the time is ripe to abandon this legislative approach based on the
nature of the act of use and focus instead on its effect. Isn’t that, after all, what
rightsholders care about? What the rightsholder in a film wants is to control and
presumably be paid for the broadcasting of the film, not the number of transient,
ephemeral other reproductions made, the fact that the work is“ performed”,
“communicated” or “transmitted by Hertzian waves,” wire, wireless networks or
otherwise. Rightsholders care about such distinctions to the extent that they represent or
affect markets. Otherwise, the technical requirements for the use of their content are
irrelevant. Professional users similarly want to be authorized to perform commercial
operations (e.g., a certain form of broadcasting at a certain date etc.) independently of
what the actual technical requirements are for this operation to be successfully
performed. Yet, today copyright focuses instead only on the technical nature of the use.

Exceptions in many national laws for ephemeral recordings are a powerful
symptom of the malaise. Broadcasting usually requires temporary copies to be made.
Because the real act to be considered is the broadcasting, not temporary copying, many
legislators opted to exempt the act of copying from copyright infringement liability.
Otherwise, the user’s need for an authorization would have been compounded by the fact
that the various fragments of the copyright bundle (reproduction, public performance in
various forms and media etc.) may very well be owned by different rightsholders, thus
requiring multiple authorizations for a single economic operation35.

derogatory action in relation to, the said work, which would be prejudicial to [the author’s] honor
or reputation.” The nature of the act clause in this Article, namely “distortion, mutilation or other
modification of, or derogatory action in relation t” is very broad, so broad in fact as to become a
non condition. The real test is the effect of the act, i.e., the prejudice to the author’s honor or
reputation. The rationale of this right is partly commercial (maintaining the integrity of the work)
as is the rationale for the right to claim authorship, the other part of the 6bis rights (ensuring that
the source is acknowledged). But part of the rationale stems, historically, from a 18th century
civil law worldview that saw a permanent tether between the author and her creation,
independently of any transfer of the work (as a object) and/or intellectual property rights therein.
35
See Daniel Gervais & Alana Maurushat, Fragmented Copyright, Fragmented Management:
Proposals to Defrag Copyright Management, 2 Can. J. of L. & Tech. 15 (2003).
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This poses new problems in the Internet environment, where most acts of use have
a dual nature from a copyright law standpoint. Any content made available on a server is
usually reproduced and performed/ communicated. To make matters worse, in
implementing the 1996 WIPO Treaties36, certain countries have introduced a new right or
fragment, usually called the “making available” right37. A single economic operation in
that context may require three or more separate authorizations, possibly leading to overor split payments (because often each rightsholder will want to be paid for the entire
economic value of the operation) and almost certainly to high if not insurmountable
rights clearance processes and transaction costs.
The “problem with copyright” was illustrated in the US Eldred v. Ashcroft38 case.
While ostensibly the plaintiff was trying to obtain a declaration of unconstitutionality of
the extension of the term of copyright protection, I would argue that a proper rescoping of
the right or more precisely the replacement of the nature of the prohibition(s) it purports
to effectuate would eliminate a significant portion of the criticisms leveled at copyright
law, especially in respect of its chilling effect39, its impact of the public domain and

36

World Intellectual Property Organisation Copyright Treaty, Dec. 20, 1996, S. Treaty Doc. No.
105-17 at 1 (1997), 36 I.L.M. 65 (hereinafter WIPO Copyright Treaty) and the World Intellectual
Property Organisation Performances and Phonograms Treaty, Dec. 20, 1996, S. Treaty Doc. No.
105-17 at 18 (1997), 36 I.L.M. 76 (hereinafter WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty).
37
See WIPO Copyright Treaty, Art. 8: “Without prejudice to the provisions of Articles 11(1)(ii),
11bis(1)(i) and (ii), 11ter(1)(ii), 14(1)(ii) and 14bis(1) of the Berne Convention, authors of
literary and artistic works shall enjoy the exclusive right of authorizing any communication to the
public of their works, by wire or wireless means, including the making available to the public of
their works in such a way that members of the public may access these works from a place and at
a time individually chosen by them”. See also WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty, Art.
8, 10, 12, 14 and 19. See, e.g., Japan’s copyright legislation: Copyright Law, Law No.48 of 1970,
as amended, art.18.
38
537 U.S. 186 (2003)
39
See Neil Weinstock Netanel, Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society, 106 Yale L.J. 283
(1996). See also Lawrence Lessig, Protecting Mickey Mouse at Art's Expense, N.Y. Times, Jan.
18, 2003, at A17: “Still, missing from the opinion was any justification for perhaps the most
damaging part of Congress's decision to extend existing copyrights for 20 years: the extension
unnecessarily stifles freedom of expression by preventing the artistic and educational use even of
content that no longer has any commercial value.” See also, Brief of Intellectual Property Law
Professors as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, available at
http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/openlaw/eldredvashcroft/supct/amici/ip-lawprofs.pdf.
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ability to use material to create new works.40 In other words, a properly defined set of
copyright norms would make the negative impact of its duration much less significant.

To abandon the nature of the act approach in favor of an effects-based test is not
only possible, but I submit encouraged by both the main international treaties and
national legislation, at least in the United States. This requires us to take a brief look at
the types of exceptions currently in existence.

III. Comparative and International Analysis of Exceptions to Copyright

Our analysis of the different nature of exceptions to copyright rights will consider
first the Berne Convention, and especially the three-step test, which will be the basis of
our suggested new core norm. We will also examine briefly the most relevant European
Union Directive and then consider the four main models of exceptions and limitations
contained in national copyright laws.

A. The Berne Convention
The Berne Convention contains a general rule, known as the “three-step test”,
which guides national legislators but only with respect to the right of reproduction41. It
may be useful to recall that the so-called three-step allows exceptions to the reproduction
right
-

in certain special cases;

-

that do not conflict with the normal commercial exploitation of the work; and

-

do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the author.

40

An interesting but somewhat different analysis was proposed by Professor Wagner on this
question. See R. Polk Wagner, Information Wants to Be Free: Intellectual Property and the
Mythologies of Control, 103 Columbia L. R. 385 (2003).
41
See DANIEL GERVAIS, THE TRIPS AGREEMENT: DRAFTING HISTORY AND ANALYSIS (2nd ed.
2003), at 144-7 and Mihály Fiscor, How Much of What? The Three-Step Test and its Application
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B. Analysis of the three-step test
The three-step test has become the cornerstone for almost all exceptions to all
intellectual property rights at the international level. It has been used as the model for
exceptions to all copyright rights in the TRIPS Agreement42 (Article 13), to the rights
created by the WIPO Copyright Treaty43 (Article 10) and the WIPO Performances and
Phonograms Treaty (Article 16). Interestingly, in the TRIPS Agreement, it is also the
basis for exceptions to industrial design protection (Article 26(2)), and patent rights
(Article 30). There is, however, a crucial difference in the case of patent rights: The last
(third) step of the test [does]not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the
patent owner, taking account of the legitimate interests of third parties.44” (emphasis
added).

1. “Certain special cases”
In his seminal book on the Berne Convention45, Professor Sam Ricketson opines
that “special” means that the exception must have a purpose and be justified by public

in Two Recent WTO Dispute settlement Cases, 192 Revue internationale du droit d’auteur 111,
231-242 (2002).
42
The TRIPS Agreement also contains a list of material excluded for copyrightability (Article
9(2)), namely “ideas, procedures, methods of operation or mathematical concepts as such.” It also
extended in its Article 13 the three-step test of the Berne Convention to cover any copyright right
(including, e.g., public performance).
43
This treaty was implemented in the United States by the Digital Millennium Copyright Act,
Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998) (hereinafter DMCA). The WIPO Copyright and
Performances and Phonograms Treaties Implementation Act of 1998 is title I of the DMCA. The
treaty has at least two interesting features for our purposes, namely the application of the threestep test in its Article 10 and the following declaration in its preamble: “Recognizing the need to
maintain a balance between the rights of authors and the larger public interest, particularly
education, research and access to information, as reflected in the Berne Convention.”
44
I am indebted to Dr. Mihály Ficsor, who shared his views on the WTO panel decision dealing
with §110(5) of the U.S. Copyright Act. See Mihály, supra note 35.
45
SAM RICKETSON, THE BERNE CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF LITERARY AND ARTISTIC
WORKS, 1886-1986 (1987)
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policy46. This purpose-oriented or teleological interpretation of the Convention is
reinforced by the use of the phrase “to the extent justified by the purpose” in Articles
10(1) and 10(2) (which allow exceptions to be made for quotation and teaching), and
Article 10bis(2) (which allows reporting of current events). The purpose of public
information is clearly the basis for the latter exception and for the possible exclusion
from copyright of certain official texts.

In the 2001 WTO panel decision concerning section 110(5) of the US Copyright
Act47, the first part of the three-step test, namely the meaning of “special,” was
interpreted for the first time by an international tribunal. The approach taken was to first
politely exclude Ricketson’s view48 and essentially to look at the Oxford dictionary49:

“The term ‘special’ connotes ‘having an individual or limited application or
purpose’, ‘containing details; precise, specific’, ‘exceptional in quality or
degree; unusual; out of the ordinary’ or ‘distinctive in some way’.[here was a
footnote referring to the Oxford dictionary] This term means that more is
needed than a clear definition in order to meet the standard of the first condition.
In addition, an exception or limitation must be limited in its field of application
or exceptional in its scope. In other words, an exception or limitation should be
narrow in quantitative as well as a qualitative sense50.”

The approach chosen is understandable. For valid policy reasons51, the WTO
Appellate Body has preferred to stick with the ordinary meaning of words, in part to
avoid introducing unbargained for concessions in the WTO legal framework52. In the
46

Id. at 482.
United-States – Section 110(5) of the US Copyright Act, WTO Document WT/DS160/R, June
15, 2000 (hereinafter Panel Report).
48
Id. at note 114.
49
Id. ¶¶ 6.108-6.110.
50
Id. ¶ 6.109.
51
Essentially, that trade-agreements are bargained for and should not, therefore, be “completed”
or amended by interpretation. See, e.g,. United States - Standards for Reformulated and
Conventional Gasoline, WTO document WT/DS2/AB/R, in which the Appellate Body stated that
“applying the basic principle of interpretation that the words of a treaty, like the General
Agreement, are to be given their ordinary meaning, in their context and in the light of the treaty’s
object and purpose.”
52
See Gervais supra note 35, at 146.
47

16

110(5) case, however, there were two problems with this approach. First, Ricketson’s
“view” was solidly anchored in the history and the text of the Convention. Second, the
logic of the WTO panel’s reasoning is incomplete. How helpful is it, from a legal
standpoint, to say that “special” means either “limited in its field of application or
exceptional in its scope”? The former criterion is not very restrictive, the second clearly
is. More importantly, the last sentence of the above quote from the case does not logically
follow from what precedes. It is not because an exception must be “limited in its field of
application” that one can conclude that it must therefore be “narrow in quantitative as
well as a qualitative sense.” This is a huge logical jump which in fact elevates the
threshold of acceptable exceptions under Berne.
I previously argued53 that the three-step test in really a two-step test and that little
time should be spent on finding the proper meaning of “special”. Indeed, if the meaning
of “special” as used in Article 13 of TRIPS and Article 9(2) of the Berne Convention is
that there should be a sound policy justification, few countries will act in a purely
arbitrary way. In addition, WTO panels should not try to step into the shoes of national
policy makers. If its meaning is that the exception should somehow be circumscribed, all
exceptions should fit the mould. Indeed, while the “dictionary approach” seems a much
safer alternative for WTO panels in most cases, in the 110(5) case it was mostly useless.
Any exception to copyright is arguably “special,” because any exception short of a
complete repeal of the Copyright Act would arguably be “limited in its field of
application.”

The two steps in the test that can truly be operationalized are thus the
“interference with commercial exploitation” and the “unreasonable prejudice to the
legitimate interests of the author”.

2. Interference with normal commercial exploitation

53

See id.
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What is the meaning of “exploitation” in the context of this second step of the
test? It seems fairly straightforward: any use of the work by which the copyright owner
tries to extract/maximize the value of her right. “Normal” is more troublesome. Does it
refer to what is simply “common” or does it refer to a normative standard? The question
is relevant in particular for new forms and emerging business models which have not thus
far been common or “normal” in an empirical sense. During the last substantive revision
of the Berne Convention in Stockholm in 1968, the concept was clearlyused to refer to
“all forms of exploiting a work which had, or were likely to acquire, considerable
economic or practical importance54.” It thus seems that the condition is normative in
nature: an exception is not allowed if it covers any form of exploitation which has, or is
likely to acquire, considerable importance. In other words, if the exception is used to
limit a commercially significant market or, a fortiori, to enter into competition with the
copyright holder, the exception is prohibited55.

We can, therefore, agree with the WTO panel on this point. It concluded as
follows:

“[…] it appears that one way of measuring the normative connotation of normal
exploitation is to consider, in addition to those forms of exploitation that
currently generate significant or tangible revenue, those forms of exploitation
which, with a certain degree of likelihood and plausibility, could acquire
considerable economic or practical importance.”56.

54

RECORDS OF THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CONFERENCE OF STOCKHOLM, JUNE 11 TO JULY
14, 1967, WIPO, Geneva (1971), at 112 (hereinafter Records of the Stockholm Conference).
55
One could see the scope of an exception based on non commercially significant use in H.R.
3261, 108th Cong. (2003), known as the Act to Prohibit the Misappropriation of Certain
Databases, §4(b) of which would allow the “making available in commerce of a substantial part
of a database by a nonprofit educational, scientific, and research institution, including an
employee or agent of such institution acting within the scope of such employment or agency, for
nonprofit educational, scientific, and research purposes […]if the court determines that the
making available in commerce of the information in the database is reasonable under the
circumstances, taking into consideration the customary practices associated with such uses of
such database by nonprofit educational, scientific, or research institutions and other factors that
the court determines relevant.”
56
Panel Report, supra note 41, at ¶ 6.180.
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3. Unreasonable prejudice to legitimate interests of rightsholder

The third step is perhaps the most difficult. What is an “unreasonable prejudice,”
and what are “legitimate interests”?

Let us start with “legitimate.” It can have two meanings: (a) conformable to,
sanctioned or authorized by, law or principle; lawful, justifiable; proper; or (b) normal;
regular; conformable to a recognized type. To put it differently, are legitimate interests
only “legal interests”? I do not believe so. I suggest that the third step is the clearest
indication of the need to balance the rights of copyright holders and users anywhere in
the Berne Convention. An analysis of the Records of the Stockholm Conference shows
that the United Kingdom took the view that legitimate meant simply “sanctioned by law,”
while other countries seems to take a broader view, meaning “justifiable” in the sense
that they are supported by social norms and relevant public policies57. In my view, and it
seems to be the approach taken by the WTO panel58, the combination of the notion of
“prejudice” with that of “interests” points quite clearly towards a legal-normative
approach. In other words, “legitimate interests” are those that are protected by law. The
interpretation might be different if the third step of the test was formulated as “the
reproduction not contrary to the legitimate interests of the author.” With the unreasonable
prejudice element, however, the legitimate interests are almost by definition legal
interests.
This leaves open one key question: what does “unreasonable prejudice” mean59.
Clearly, the word “unreasonable” indicates that some level or degree of prejudice is
justified. To buttress this view, the French version of the Berne Convention, which
57

See Records of the Stockholm Conference, supra note 48.
Panel Report, supra note 41, at ¶¶ 6.223-6.229. Atparagraph 6.224 the panel somehow tried to
reconcile the two approaches: “the term relates to lawfulness from a legal positivist perspective,
but it has also the connotation of legitimacy from a more normative perspective, in the context of
calling for the protection of interests that are justifiable in the light of the objectives that underlie
the protection of exclusive rights.”
58
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governs in case of a discrepancy60, uses the expression “préjudice injustifié ,” which one
would be tempted to translate as “unjustified prejudice.” The translators opted instead for
“not unreasonable.” 61

I would suggest that the inclusion of a reasonableness/justifiability criterion is a
key that allows legislators to establish a balance between, on the one hand, the rights of
authors and other copyright holders and the needs and interests of users, on the other.
This seems even clearer when the French term (“unjustified”) is used. In other words,
there must be a public interestjustification to limit copyright.

As a result, I cannot agree with the WTO panel, which essentially conflated the
second and third steps when it concluded that “prejudice to the legitimate interests of
right holders reaches an unreasonable level if an exception or limitation causes or has the
potential to cause an unreasonable loss of income to the copyright owner62.” A public
interest imperative may lead a government to impose an exception to copyright that may
translate into a loss of revenue for copyright holders. It can nonetheless be “justified”. In
addition, by focusing on economic harm, the panel may have considerably expanded the
scope of exceptions: it is not the fact that a user obtained some value that is
determinative, but rather the fact that a rightsholder can show that it lostactual value
(revenue), i.e, the existence of a prejudice. This view is reinforced by the arbitration
decision and the fact that non-implementation leads to a determination of the level of
harm suffered.63
59

It is worth noting that “not unreasonable prejudice” is not quite the same as “reasonable
prejudice.” “Not unreasonable” seems to connote a slightly stricter threshold (See Panel Report,
supra note 41 at ¶ 6.225).
60
Berne Convention, supra note 26, at Art. 31.
61
Records of the Stockholm Conference, supra note 48, at 1145 § 84.
62
Panel Report, supra note 41, ¶ 6.229.
63
Under the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) that governs the WTO dispute-settlement
process, a party may ask for arbitration if another party fails to implement an adopted panel (or
Appellate Body) decision. Because the US failed to implement the Panel report (which is still
true as of March 2004-- the WTO had ordered the United States to bring the exemption in line
with the Panel’s ruling by July 27, 2001), the European Union asked for arbitration and decision
on the level of harm, which was determined to be $1.1 million/year. The European Union has
proposed levying a fee on copyrighted material against United States nationals unless the United
States reforms its law. See World Trade Organization Dispute Settlement Panel on United States--
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Let us look at national and regional legislation to determine the parameters of exceptions
to copyright.

C. European “InfoSoc” Directive
The European Union’s Information Society (“InfoSoc”) Directive64 contains two
sets of exceptions. The first, and only mandatory, exception is for transient copies
“forming an integral and essential part of a technological process.” Otherwise, the
Directive contains an exhaustive list of permitted exceptions (i.e., exceptions that EU
member States may choose to use in their national copyright legislation). These are all
purpose-specific exceptions. There is no set of criteria comparable to the US fair use
doctrine65.

However, the preamble to this Directive, which serves as a guideline for the
interpretation of the operative part of the text66, refers to permitting “exceptions or
limitations in the public interest for the purpose of education and teaching” and to the
need to safeguard a “fair balance of rights and interests between the different categories
of rightsholders, as well as between the different categories of rightsholders and users”
through exceptions and limitations, which “have to be reassessed in the light of the new
electronic environment.”67

Section 110(5) of the U.S. Copyright Act, WT/DS160/22 (Mar. 1, 2002); World Trade
Organization Dispute Settlement Panel on United States--Section 110(5) of the U.S. Copyright
Act, WT/DS160/12 (Feb. 19, 2002); World Trade Organization Dispute Settlement Panel on
United States-- Section 110(5) of the U.S. Copyright Act, WT/DS160/19 (Jan. 11, 2002); World
Trade Organization Dispute Settlement Panel on United States--Section 110(5) of the U.S.
Copyright Act, WT/DS160/12 (Jan. 15, 2001).
64
Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2001 on the
Harmonisation of Certain Aspects of Copyright and Related Rights in the Information Society.
65
As embodied in 17 USC §107. See supra note 13.
66
Directive 2001/29/EC, supra note 57.
67
Directive 2001/29/EC, supra note 57, ¶ 14 and ¶ 31.

21

Otherwise, the Directive also refers to the three-step test as an overarching test for
all permitted exceptions. Article 5(5) reads:

“The exceptions and limitations provided for in paragraphs 1, 2, 3 and 4 shall only
be applied in certain special cases which do not conflict with a normal exploitation
of the work or other subject matter and do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate
interests of the rightholder.”

D. National Laws
Exceptions in national copyright laws can be grouped under four main headings.
The first, I reserve for fair use68 and do not need to belabor its content here.

1. Fair dealing

A second category is the fair dealing approach of other common law countries,
generally modeled after the UK Copyright Act of 191169. These consist of a list of
situations where “dealing” with a protected work is permitted combined with a
requirement that the use be fair in light of the purpose. These specific purposes are
usually related to criticism and review, news reporting, teaching, archives and libraries,
use by visually impaired readers, etc70. In a recent Canadian Supreme Court decision, the
research component was interpreted very broadly, apparently covering even for-profit
research71. The fairness criterion usually requires that no more of the work be used than
was necessary for the (authorized) purpose72.

68

See supra note 13.

69

Copyright Act, 1911, 1 & 2 Geo. 5, c. 46 (Eng.)
See, e.g. Copyright Act, R.S.C., c. C-42, §§ 29-30 (1985) (Can.), Copyright Act 1968, c.63 as
amended, §§ 40-42 (Austl.), and Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, c.48, §§ 29 - 30
(Eng.).
71
CCH v. Law Society of Upper Canada, [2004] SCC 13 (Can). (“The fair dealing exception
under s. 29 is open to those who can show that their dealings with a copyrighted work were for
the purpose of research or private study. ‘Research’ must be given a large and liberal
70
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Commonwealth members are not the only countries where fair dealing exists.
Israel has a fair dealing with civil law overtones. According to Sec. 2(1) of the Copyright
Act, 191173, fair dealing for the purposes of private study, research, criticism and review,
or to make a journalistic summary is allowed. Interestingly, however, in determining
whether a particular dealing was fair, the Israeli Supreme Court used the US fair use
criteria.74 The “desirable social goal” was clearly mentioned as a relevant criterion.75
There are additional exceptions for private recording76, public recitation77 and
education,78 and good faith is considered a defense against all remedies except
injunction79.

2. Civil law enumeration approach

The third category is that used in most civil law countries, where certain very
narrow uses are allowed without authorization and usually without an express
interpretation in order to ensure that users’ rights are not unduly constrained. I agree with the
Court of Appeal that research is not limited to non-commercial or private contexts.”) (Emphasis
added)
72
See idem. (“the following factors [should]be considered in assessing whether a dealing was fair:
(1) the purpose of the dealing; (2) the character of the dealing; (3) the amount of the dealing; (4)
alternatives to the dealing; (5) the nature of the work; and (6) the effect of the dealing on the
work. Although these considerations will not all arise in every case of fair dealing, this list of
factors provides a useful analytical framework to govern determinations of fairness in future
cases.”) See also WILLIAM PATRY, THE FAIR USE PRIVILEGE IN COPYRIGHT LAW, (2nd ed.,
1995), at 594-599. See also JAMES LAHORE & WARWICK A. ROTHNIE, COPYRIGHT AND DESIGNS
(2003) at §§ 40.050, 40.065 and 40.115-40.130 (Austl.); WILLIAM CORNISH & DAVID
LLEWELYN, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: PATENTS, COPYRIGHT, TRADEMARKS AND ALLIED
RIGHTS, (5th ed., 2003), at 440-448 (Eng.); and DAVID VAVER, COPYRIGHT LAW (2000), at § Fair
Dealing (Can.).
73
Copyright Act, 1911, 1 and 2 Geo. 5, ch. 46, (Extension to Palestine) S.R. & O. 1924, No. 385
(U.K.).
74
See Geva v. Walt Disney Co., P.L.A. 2687/92, P.D. (1) 251. This is not far from the six criteria
used by the Canadian Supreme Court. See supra note 72.
75
Id. and see Joshua Weisman, Israel, in INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT LAW AND PRACTICE, at
ISR-38-39 (M. Nimmer & P. Geller eds., 1991)
76
Copyright Act, supra note 64 §§ 3C and 3D. A right to remuneration is provided.
77
Id. § 2(1)(VI).
78
Id. § 2(1)(IV).
79
See Weisman, supra note 66 at ISR-41.
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requirement of fairness. The types of free uses allowed are usually very well defined and
limited in scope. A few national examples may be useful to illustrate the scope of these
exceptions.

In France, the rights of authors are almost sacred. Therefore, exceptions to
copyright are interpreted narrowly and users clearly have no rights following from those
exceptions under copyright law.80 Exceptions are mostly for private use.81 In one case,
and then only in a obiter, a French court said it would be prepared to consider a defense
to infringement based on the “public’s right to information,” which is recognized under
Article 10.1 of the European Convention on Human Rights.82 There is a also a
recognition, in France and in Germany,83 that authors must be granted a certain freedom
to reuse works of other authors and that such “freedom” is normatively at a higher level
than the right of a simple user, in particular a commercial user.84
The main exception under Dutch copyright law is for private use.85 It applies to
both reproduction and performance. The private copying exception applies to companies
in the area of press and journal reviews. There is an exception for quotations86, use by
government87 and for public education88. Universities believed they could freely
produce “anthologies” (coursepacks) for students but after losing a court battle in 1986
made an agreement with the Dutch publishers and reprography collective.89 There are
also interesting exceptions specific to the field of fine arts. Section 19 allows “the
80

See ANDRÉ LUCAS & H.- J. LUCAS, TRAITÉ DE LA PROPRIÉTÉ LITTÉRAIRE ET ARTISTIQUE, (2nd
ed., 2001), at 251-254.
81
Code de la propriété intellectuelle, § L.122-5.
82
TGI Paris, 3rd ch., 23 Feb. 1999, D. 1999 580.
83
See the Alcolix and Asterix Persiflagen cases, both by the Federal Court (BGH ), at [1994]
GRUR 191 and 206, also available in English at [1994] IIC 605 and 610; and the “Germania 3”
case, [2001] GRUR 149.
84
In French, known as the “exploitant” ( “exploiter”) of the work—an indication of the mindset.
See ALAIN STROWEL, DROIT D’AUTEUR ET COPYRIGHT 268 (1993).
85
See Herman Cohen Jehoram, in INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note
66 at NETH-62,3; and § 16 of the Copyright Act, 1912 (as last amended by the Law of October
27, 1972).
86
Copyright Act, supra note 76 at § 15a.
87
Id § 15b.
88
Id. § 16.
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reproduction of a portrait by or on behalf of the person portrayed,” while Section 24
allows “unless otherwise agreed, the author of a painting [to] make further similar
paintings,” notwithstanding the transfer of his copyright.

In the Nordic countries, there are exceptions for private reproduction coupled with
a remuneration system (levy), as in s. 12(1) of the Swedish Copyright Act90. Exceptions
are also provided for quotations91 and use by libraries and archives92. The remuneration
system for private copying is highly developed in most Nordic countries. For example
Norwegian schools and universities paid €39.06 per university student and €34.13 per
college students in 2002-2003 just for photocopies.93

3. Considerations Concerning Private Use

A fourth and final “category’, which in reality isa subset of the second and third,
deals with private use. But the rationale is different. Legislators tend to see private use as
uncontrollable, technically but also from a policy standpoint.94 In other words, they are
not excluded because of a public interest imperative but almost as a practical matter
following from the unenforceability of the right. Whether often accompanied by a
remuneration on blank media, recording equipment or both, certain private uses, usually
limited to reproduction and performance for family and friends, is allowed. Clearly,
these exceptions have end-users in mind, because they use works in ways that, at least
pre-Internet, did not interfere with “normal commercial exploitation” and were, in fact,
uncontrollable.

89

See Informatierecht/AMI 1986/5, 119-121.
An Act on Copyright in Literary and Artistic Works, Law No. 729, of December 30, 1960, as
last amended by Law No. 1274, of December 7, 1995.
91
Id. § 22.
92
Id. § 16.
93
KOPINOR News, No. 2 vol. 6, Summer 2002. See www.kopinor.no. As of October 31, 2003,
the U.S. equivalents are $45.50 and $39.75 respectively.
94
In the sense that enforcement of copyright vis-à-vis individual users was not foreseen. The
RIAA (civil) and Australian (criminal) lawsuits may force us to question the assumption.
90
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The recent adoption by the European Parliament of a Directive concerning the
enforcement of intellectual property rights is not consonant with this approach and allows
stringent enforcement measures, such as search and seizure of equipment and other
provisional measures against not only professional pirates but also, it seems, individual
end-users95, and a right to order the disclosure of the origin of infringing material96. In
the case of infringements on a commercial scale, additional measures, such as seizure of
bank accounts, is also provided97.

A final type of exception, if that is what it is, is the exhaustion of rights, also
known as the first-sale doctrine98. Conceptually, it is very close to the private use
exceptions and is congruent with the idea that end-users should be free to use lawfullyacquired copies as they wish, but could also be said to reflect a balance between the
chattel rights of the user and the intellectual property rights of the copyright owner. This
was the approach chosen by the Supreme Court of Canada in a recent decision99. Binnie
J., writing the majority opinion, stated:

“The proper balance among these and other public policy objectives lies not
only in recognizing the creator's rights but in giving due weight to their limited
nature. In crassly economic terms it would be as inefficient to overcompensate
artists and authors for the right of reproduction as it would be self-defeating to
under-compensate them. Once an authorized copy of a work is sold to a member
of the public, it is generally for the purchaser, not the author, to determine what
happens to it.

95

See Art. 8 of the “Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on
measures and procedures to ensure the enforcement of intellectual property rights - Text agreed
by the Permanent Representatives Committee following its meetings on 11 and 13 February 2004
with a view to reaching agreement with the European Parliament at first reading”, EU Council
document 6376/04 of 16 February 2004 (8 March 2004). Available at
<http://europa.eu.int/comm/internal_market/en/indprop/piracy/>.
96
Idem, Art. 9.
97
Idem, Art. 10.
98
See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
99
Théberge v. Galeries d’art du Petit-Champlain, Inc., [2002] SCC 34. The decision was
“confirmed” in a unanimous decision by the same Court in March 2004. See supra note 71.
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This case demonstrates the basic economic conflict between the holder of the
intellectual property in a work and the owner of the tangible property that
embodies the copyrighted expressions.100” (emphasis added)

E. Application of copyright exceptions to the Internet
Analogue-era exceptions to copyright do not apply easily to the Internet environment.101
Let us start with private use. In several countries, blank tape levies are now imposed on
blank digital media. In Greece, the levy was applicable to personal computers (PCs)102
and the same could be true of Germany, according to proposals made by VG WORT103,
the reprography collective in that country. In Canada, private copying now applies to
CDR, CD audio and, as of February 2004, also to certain types of removable memory
devices. The levy on Apple’s iPod and similar devices is now $CAN25 (approximately
US$19) per unit.104
Can a levy on a PC achieve the same “rough justice” purpose105 as a levy on a
blank audio cassette? There was minimal cross-subsidization in the case of cassettes (few
people recorded sounds other than protected music, or their own music), and in aggregate
the measure could be said to be fair because most of the material recorded was
100

Id. ¶¶ 31-33.
See PETERS, supra note 27 and accompanying text.
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presumably recorded music. Perhaps the same is true of MP3-specific recording
apparatus, but is the same true of CD-Rs? When it comes to PCs, however, clearly
copying recorded music, except for a minority of users, will not be the main activity.
Cross-subsidization thus becomes the rule rather than the exception.

More fundamentally, is it more desirable, from a policy standpoint, to regulate
private use in a digital environment than it was in the analogue one? The answer is multifaceted. Technical protection measures are now routinely used to limit the type of private
use that one can make with some forms of protected content. The policy justification is
that private use is in fact no longer private because end-users become intermediaries by
re-disseminating the content (such as in peer-to-peer situations). In addition, current
copyright rights focus on various uses of protected material, not their effects. In that
respect, the DMCA106 probably introduced an entirely different layer of rights, an access
right, which is not linked to the protection of the use of the content and is independent of
whether the use benefits from a license or exception107. Measures to scan hard disks and
sundry spyware pushed on individual users were the subject of debate in Congress.108
Yet, until the DMCA and in the entire history of copyright, measures destined to control
end-users were by far the exception and not the rule.109
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Another huge shift in the application of copyright exceptions is of course that
online access has replaced distribution (of copies) with licensing. Hence the first-sale
doctrine, perhaps one the most important “exceptions” to copyright, is fast disappearing.
This applies to professional users, such as in inter-library loans situations, but also to
individuals who can no longer pass on content that they no longer wish to use to other
users

IV. The Way Forward
A. The Reverse Three-step test
Fair use is one of the keys to understand the way forward I am proposing. I am not
suggesting that US-style fair use be introduced in all countries. Clearly, however, fair
use is a much more flexible and adaptable doctrine with respect to new forms of use than
purpose-specific exception110, most of which are not technologically-neutral.111 This
explains why its introduction is being considered in a number of countries currently using
the more restrictive fair dealing exceptions112. If one can agree with the premise that fair
use reflects an appropriate set of criteria to balance the rights of copyright holders and the
needs and interests of users, I suggest it could serve as a basis to build the copyright of
the future.113 To do this, we must internationalize the test, by combining it with the
Berne three-step test. 114
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Fair use is an exception to copyright115 or more precisely a test to determine
whether a use of copyrighted content not authorized by the rightsholder constitutes an
infringement of the copyright. In the same way, the three-step test is the accepted
international standard to determine whether an exception to copyright in national
legislation is TRIPS-compliant.116

What I suggest is reversing the test, based on the assumption that what the
exception (whether fair use in domestic US law or the three-step test at the multilateral
level) does not allow is what in fact copyright intended to protect. Expressed in
mathematical terms, if fair use is the “A” universe, then the “non-A” universe contains
uses that require a license. The reversal, as we will see, is both appropriate and powerful.
It is appropriate because it focuses on the effect of the use on rightsholders. The right
(which can be viewed as the “non-exempt” universe) isalso effects-based, thus
addressing much of the criticism examined above.117 It is powerful because it both solves
the issues related to the nature-based bundle now used in most national laws118 and is by
definition TRIPS-compliant. If uses not allowed by the three-step test are protected (i.e.,
only uses allowed under the three-step test are exempted), there can be no violation of
Berne. Other solutions requiring an amendment to TRIPS do not have the same appeal,
simply because amending the Agreement seems far from simple politically.119

115

For the purposes of this analysis, we do not need to enter into the debate as to whether fair use
is a right, whether one can derogate to fair use by contract, etc. For more on these debates See
LUCIE M.C.R. GUIBAULT, COPYRIGHT LIMITATIONS AND CONTRACTS: AN ANALYSIS OF THE
CONTRACTUAL OVERRIDABILITY OF LIMITATIONS ON COPYRIGHT (2002); and L. RAY
PATTERSON & STANLEY W. LINDBERG, THE NATURE OF COPYRIGHT: A LAW OF USERS’ RIGHTS
(1991), at 191-222.
116
See supra section III.B
117
See GUIBAULT, supra note 98, at § Definition of the Problem.
118
Though not all. See infra note 110 and accompanying text.
119
Recent debates in the context of the Doha Round have shown that any modification of the
TRIPS Agreement will be extremely difficult to achieve. One reason is that once the Agreement
is reopened, all of its contents may become fair game. An attempt to update the copyright section
(Articles 9-14) may thus prompt demands by others to reopen the patent or enforcement sections.
As of March 2004, there were ongoing consultations on how to convert the 30 August 2003
Decision on paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration (on access to generic medicines) into an
amendment of the TRIPS Agreement.. See GERVAIS, supra note 35, at 43-51.

30

How does one reverse the test? Starting from a domestic US viewpoint, the
question would be simply as follows: If fair use is fair, then what use is unfair use? I
submit that “unfair” (i.e., protected) use would be use that does not meet the two real
steps of the Berne three-step test, that is, use that interferes with normal commercial
exploitation or unreasonably (unjustifiably) prejudices the copyright holder’s rights. Any
use that demonstrably and substantially reduces financial benefits that the copyright
owner can reasonably expect to receive under normal commercial circumstances would
be “unfair” without authorization.

How one measures unfairness and interference with normal commercial
exploitation in this context is fundamental. I suggest that the question should not be not
whether a user got “value” without paying but whether the user should have obtained the
content through a normal commercial transaction120. Three observations are in order:
First, this clearly applies only to published content121. Second, it is not because a work is
unavailable in a given form that taking is ipso facto fair because no normal commercial
transaction is possible. Rightsholders must be given a certain degree of flexibility in how
they make works available on various markets and in various formats. It also means,
however, that market practices are relevant: Is the type of use or user one that would
normally be licensed (on a transactional or collective basis)? Is the kind of material
normally (only) available on a commercial basis? Finally, it is essential to view normalcy
(of commercial exploitation) as a dynamic notion that is influenced by technological
development and consumer behavior. It is clear, in my view, that the Internet may have
changed what “normal commercial exploitation” means. Unlicensed access for private
use to material available on the Internet should in most cases be considered normal122.
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The second step of the Berne test, namely the unreasonable prejudice to legitimate
interests of the rightsholder, is one of public interest v. author’s rights.123 The relevant
rights must be those protected under the Copyright Act. This is where the reasoning
blends the two steps (without, one hopes, becoming circular). The author has a right in
respect of any commercially significant use (use that would normally be the subject of a
commercial transaction). Any situation not covered by this right would be one that is not
subject to normal commercial exploitation and is justified by a valid public interest
purpose.

B. Comparison with Other Proposals
There have been various suggestions to create a “use right,” because the current
fragmented lists of copyright rights do not mesh with the reality of cyberspace. Prof.
Litman suggested such a right in her Digital Copyright book124. Stanford law professor
Lawrence Lessig points in that direction, notably in The Future of Ideas, first when he
discusses the VCR example and the potential for substantial non-infringing uses125 and
then when he writes,

In responding to the shock that the Internet presents to copyright law, it is of
course important to account for the increased exposure to theft. But the law
must also draw a balance to assure that this proper response to an increased risk
of theft does not simultaneously erase the important range of access and use
rights traditionally protected under copyright law.
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Professor Andrew Christie has also suggested a use-based copyright right126. Prof.
Christie proposes that patrimonial rights be grouped in two categories: reproduction and
dissemination.127 Professor Ricketson criticized this type of simplification, however.128
There is also a proposal to create a specific right to “Internet transmission,”129 which
might resolve certain problems specific to the Internet.
The approach suggested by Professor Jessica Litman is a priori the most
interesting, but as Professor Ginsburg rightly emphasizes,130 the conceptualization must
be pushed much farther. In my opinion, one should also take into account international
treaties, particularly the TRIPS Agreement131.
Other examples of attempts at simplification can be found in certain national laws.
These attempts are incomplete, and none moves all the way toward an effects-based
paradigm. This being said, the efforts deserve to be underlined. One of the best examples
is the Swiss Copyright Act,

132

which provides, in Article 10, “The author has the exclusive

right to decide when and how his work will be used.”
China also has a fairly broad notion of copyright, approaching a use right. The
relevant provisions of the Copyright Law133 read as follows:

“Article 55 Exclusive Rights

(1) Unless otherwise provided, the author shall have the exclusive right to use his
work, in whole or in part, including notably the right to disclose, publish and
126
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economically exploit it in any form, either directly or indirectly, within the limits
of the law;
(2)The guarantee of the pecuniary benefits deriving from exploitation of the work
shall constitute the basic objective, in economic terms, of legal protection134.”
(emphasis added)
The Canadian government recently opened the door to a broad reflection on this
subject by putting on the agenda a review of the question of “clarification and
135

simplification of the law.”

These proposals are interesting and many reflect or incorporate solutions to the
problem of copyright laws and treaties: a fragmented bundle of rights focusing on the
nature of the use rather than its effects.

What I am suggesting is that to go a step further and use the recognized
international test now applicable to all copyright exceptions as the basis to determine the
appropriate scope of copyright and, by way of consequence, the appropriate exceptions.
That scope should extend to the control of only commercially significant forms of normal
exploitation, the normalcy of exploitation being measured dynamically in light of
changing technological possibilities and societal norms.

Two additional remarks are in order. My reasoning only applies to the so-called
economic rights136. Moral rights (of authorship and integrity) protected by the Berne
Convention should be analyzed separately. Exceptions to such moral rights cannot be
based on commercial exploitation, but on a combined test of public interest137 and
practicality.
134
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Second, the approach I am suggesting has the advantage of being compatible with
existing international treaties. Trying to renegotiate the main copyright treaties would not
be easy and by the time we are done, digital may have been replaced by “trigital”
technology or whatever comes next, and a host of new challenges for copyright, or should
I say “useright” lawyers.

C. Further Considerations on an Effects-Based Test

As mentioned above138, one of the weaknesses of copyright law is that it focuses on the
nature of the use. As a result, whether one uses a work for private use, to make
commercial use or to make a transformative use is of no concern as far as the rights are
concerned: what matters is that technically a reproduction has taken place. To
circumvent this structural difficulty, exceptions (e.g., for private use139, parody140 etc.)
were added to the mix.

Using an effects-based test would allow courts to draw appropriate distinctions.
In almost all cases, non-transformative commercial reuse will infringe the second or third
part of the three-step test, or both, due to the effect on the market of the rightsholder(s)
and the absence of an overriding public interest. A private use normally will not have an
effect and it may be considered desirable to allow private use, both because the cost (in

30 […] …copyright is essentially not a positive but a negative right. No provision of the
Copyright Act confers in terms, upon the owner of a copyright in a literary work, the right to
publish it. The Act gives the owner of the copyright the right to prevent others from doing that
which the Act recognises the owner alone has a right to do. Thus copyright is antithetical to
freedom of expression. It prevents all, save the owner of the copyright, from expressing
information in the form of the literary work protected by the copyright.
34 […] the defense to a claim for breach of copyright that can be mounted on the basis of "public
interest.’ This is not a statutory defence, but one which arises at common law,[…]”
138
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139
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140
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terms, e.g., of privacy invasion141) and the public interest considerations of favoring
broad access to information and culture. It will thus pass the test. In that case,
implementing an effects-based test simply avoids they current labyrinthine process of
determining that there was a reproduction or other use (i.e., the nature-based test) and
then looking for an exception.

But the most striking impact would be in the area of transformative reuse. There
is a public interest in allowing creators to reuse existing material, something recognized
in many legal systems142, including the United States where the Supreme Court arguably
stretched the notion of parody well beyond its ordinary meaning to accommodate this
objective.143

By introducing an effects-based test, reuse of material would be allowed not just
in parody cases, but in all cases where a genuine public interest is served by allowing a
new creation to emerge without demonstrably affecting (negatively) the market for the
preexisting work.

Conclusion
This paper first showed that, while exceptions to copyright have historically focused on
the effects of a particular use of protected works, the rights to which these exceptions
141
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apply are based on the nature of the use. This has at least two undesirable consequences.
First, it forces copyright holders to organize the legal structure of protection against
technical forms of use where in fact their real concern is with the market and the effects
that a particular use may have in reducing or enhancing future market options. Second,
there is a logical discrepancy between the right and the exception which renders
exceptions difficult to apply and their borders very difficult to circumscribe.

In the search for a solution to enhance the current situation, we suggested that an
effects-based norm (a new copyright right) would better respond to problems that
copyright holders currently face, in particular on the Internet, while enhancing legal
security for users by increasing the correlation between the right and the exception.

Because the three-step test found in Article 9(2) of the Berne Convention is now
the foundation for all exceptions to intellectual property rights in treaties concluded since
1994, including the TRIPS Agreement, we first studied this fundamental test and its
application in key national and regional laws to determine what uses would be allowed
under it. We then suggested reversing the test, as it were, to determine the scope of
disallowed uses, ie those to which the exclusive right of the copyright owner should
apply. The proposal, in effect, is that rights be defined to mirror permissible exceptions
under Berne Article 9(2) and Article 13 of TRIPS. In doing so, international copyright
treaties would no longer constitute set of minimum standards with a cap on permissible
exceptions but rather coherent normative approach to regulating commercially significant
uses of material, including on the Internet.

We then analyzed this proposal against extant proposals to improve or simplify
international copyright norms. The last section of the article demonstrates that the use of
an effects-based test would both simplify the determination of infringements and allow
greater transformative reuse of protected material.
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